API RP 14C:2001 pdf download
API RP 14C:2001 pdf download.Recommended Practice for Analysis, Design, Installation, and Testing of Basic Surface Safety Systems for Offshore Production Platforms.
3.1 PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES
The purpose of a production platform surface safety system is to protect personnel, the environment, and the facility from threats to safety caused by the production process. The purpose of a safety analysis is to identify undesirable events that might pose a threat to safety. aiid define reliable protective measures that will prevent such events or minimize their effects if they occur. Potential threats to safety are identified through proven systems analysis techniques that have been adapted to the production process. Recommended protective measures are common industry practices proven through long experience. The systems analysis and protective measures have been combined into a “safety analysis” for offshore production platforms.
The technical content of this recommended practice establishes a firm basis for designing and documenting a production platform safety system for a process composed of components and systems normally used offshore. Moreover, it establishes guidelines for analyzing components or systems that are new or significantly different from those covered in this document.
After a production platform surface safety system is placed in operation, procedures should be established to assure continued system integrity. Appendix D, Testing and Reporting Procedures, may be used for this purpose.
3.2 SAFETY FLOW CHART
Figure 3-1 is a safety flow chart depicting the manner in which undesirable events could result in personnel injury. pollution, or facility damage. It also shows where safety devices or procedures should be used to prevent the propagation of undesirable events. As shown on the chart, the release of hydrocarbons is a factor in virtually all threats to safety. Thus, the major objective of the safety system should be to prevent the release of hydrocarbons from the process and to minimize the adverse effects of such releases if they occur.
a. RefetTing to Figure 3-1, the overall objectives may be enumerated as follows:
I. Prevent undesirable events that could lead to a release
of hydrocarbons.
2. Shut in the process or affected part of the process to stop the flow of hydrocarbons to a leak or overflow if it occurs.
3. Accumulate and recover hydrocarbon liquids and disperse gases that escape from the process.
4. Prevent ignition of released hydrocarbons.
5. Shut in the process in the event of a fire.
6. Prevent undesirable events that could cause the release of hydrocarbons from equipment other than that in which the event occurs.
3.3 MODES OF SAFETY SYSTEM OPERATION
The operating modes of the safety system should be (a) automatic monitoring and automatic protective action if an abnormal condition indicating an undesirable event can be detected by a sensor, (b) automatic protective action if manually actuated by personnel who observe or are alerted to an unsafe condition by an alarm, and (c) continuous protection by support systems that minimize the effects of escaping hydrocarbons. The Emergency Shutdown (ESD) System is important, even on platforms that are not continuously manned, because most accidents and failures are caused by personnel. Thus, personnel may be available to actuate the ESD System.
3.4 PREMISES FOR BASIC ANALYSIS AND DESIGN
The recommended analysis and design procedures for a platform safety system are based on the following premises:
a. The process facility will be designed for safe operation in accordance with good engineering practices.
b. The safety system should provide two levels of protection to prevent or minimize the effects of an equipment failure within the process. The two levels of protection should be independent of and in addition to the control devices used in normal process operation. In general, the two levels should be provided by functionally different types of safety devices for a wider spectrum of coverage. Two identical devices would have the same characteristics and might have the same inherent weaknesses.
c. The two levels of protection should be the highest order (primary) and next highest order (secondary) available. Judgment is required to determine these two highest orders for a given situation. As an example, two levels of protection from a rupture due to overpressure might be provided by a PSH and a PSL. The PSH prevents the rupture by shutting in affected equipment before pressure becomes excessive.
