ASME NQA.TR-2020 pdf download

ASME NQA.TR-2020 pdf download.Evolution of Quality Assurance Principles and Requirements in the U.S. Nuclear Industry.
(b) Some project managers believed that quality assurance program establishment and implementation was the primary responsibility and role of the quality assurance organization. This misconception was fostered in part by some quality assurance organizations that believed that the quality assurance plans, requirements, and procedures were written by and for the quality assurance organization. They failed to recognize a fundamental quality assurance principle that quality and its achievement are primary management responsibilities; the quality assurance organization supports top and line management in executing their quality assurance programs and by conducting independent audits.
Prior to 1968, there were no formal quality assurance requirements imposed by the AEC and its management and operating contractors on GOCO nuclear facilities conducting reactor development and technology activities. This situation presented an early quality management dichotomy for the National Aeronautical and Space Administration (NASA) quality engineers who had technical and quality management oversight of some joint AEC-NASA space exploration programs. For example, in the mid-1960s, NASA’s Space Nuclear Auxiliary Power (SNAP) programs imposed rigorous quality assurance and quality control requirements from NASA NHB 5300.4(1B) on some of its prime contractors, e.g., Aerojet General in Azusa, CA, and General Electric in Evendale,OH. In MIL-l-45208A, NASA delegated to DOD Air Force, Navy, and other contract administration agencies certain DOD inspection system requirements for nonnuclear, non-mission-critical components of the power conversion system being developed by the contractor. NASA quality assurance program managers were disappointed to learn that the AEC did not impose any formal quality assurance or quality control requirements on the SNAP reactor-system-development contractors. The Associate Director at NASA’s Lewis Research Center brought this situation to the attention of the joint AEC-NASA organization.
In mid-1968, senior managers at the AEC Division of Reactor Development and Technology (RDT) acknowledged the need for a comprehensive quality assurance program standard that could be imposed on GOCO reactors, technology development programs, national laboratories, and test facilities.5 RDT management agreed to develop the new RDT standard that would be designed to address not only the quality program and inspection system specifications of MIL-Q-9858A and MIL145208A but also the more comprehensive quality and reliability assurance program requirements of NASA NHB 5300.4(1B). The proposed standard would provide requirements for planning, management, and engineering activities as well as additional requirements for design review, design verification testing, qualification testing, and development testing.
It is noteworthy that Admiral Hyman G. Rickover’s AEC Naval Reactors programs employed some of these design control elements as a part of their normal design engineering activities, although they were not called quality assurance elements. So, it was not too difficult to convince the RDT line managers who came from Naval Reactors that design control was still their line responsibility under the broad quality assurance umbrella.
With the participation of the major AEC national laboratories and maintenance and operation contractors, RDT Director Milton Shaw authorized in late 1968 a working group, managed by the author, to develop the new standard. RDT F2-2T was issued in June 1969 under the RDT standards program managed by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
RDT F2-2T was written in a phased format that could be selectively applied to a facility or project, depending on the scope of the quality assurance program activities. The phases flowed from initial quality assurance program planning through design and development; procurement; manufacturing, fabrication, and assembly; construction and installation; to facility operation, maintenance, and modification.
RDT F2-2T covered all of the basic quality assurance criteria of 10 C.F.R. 50, Appendix B. Also included were quality assurance program requirements for design descriptions, development testing, engineering studies, operational readiness reviews, unusual occurrence reporting, data collection methods, material certification, alloy verification, and management reviews. Many of these RDT F2-2T quality assurance requirements had been proven to be effective in earlier NASA flight system and ground support operations.
RDT F2-2T was a dynamic standard that was fully endorsed and used by RDT technical and quality assurance managers. At the request of RDT managers, RDT F2-2T was amended ten times from 1969 to 1983 to improve the effectiveness of quality assurance program implementation based on user experience and on unusual occurrences reported during design, construction, and operation of numerous AEC/DOE reactors and test facilities. These amendments included
— purchaser approval of repairs and waivers.